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Inﬂ   uenza viruses, including highly pathogenic avian 
inﬂ   uenza virus (H5N1), could threaten blood safety. We 
analyzed 10,272 blood donor samples with a minipool 
nucleic acid amplication technique. Analytical sensitivity of 
the method was 804 geq/mL and 444 geq/mL for generic 
inﬂ   uenza primers and inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) subtype–speciﬁ  c 
primers. This study demonstrates that such screening for 
inﬂ  uenza viruses is feasible.
I
n the 20th century, 3 inﬂ  uenza-related pandemics oc-
curred (1918 Spanish inﬂ  uenza, 1957 Asian inﬂ  uenza, 
and 1968 Hong Kong inﬂ  uenza) (1), which are now known 
to represent 3 different antigenic subtypes of the inﬂ  uenza 
A virus: H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2. Major inﬂ  uenza epidem-
ics show neither periodicity nor a predictable pattern, and 
all differ from one another. Evidence suggests that true 
pandemics involving changes in hemagglutinin subtypes 
are caused by genetic reassortment in animal inﬂ  uenza A 
viruses. Since 2003, the World Health Organization has 
reported the infection of ≈218 persons and 124 deaths 
(56.9%; as of May 23, 2006) caused by the (H5N1) sub-
type in 10 different countries; a probable person-to-person 
transmission of the avian inﬂ  uenza virus was suggested (2). 
Most countries predicted death rates of 14–1,685 persons 
per 100,000 population in the event of a pandemic and es-
timated that up to 2,707 persons per 100,000 population 
would become infected (3).
Our study demonstrates that screening donor blood 
for inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) subtype or for inﬂ  uenza viruses in 
general by minipool nucleic acid ampliﬁ  cation technique 
(NAT) is feasible. To ensure the safety of blood prod-
ucts, this screening technique could be introduced into the 
blood-screening procedure without delay in the case of a 
pandemic.
The Study
To increase blood safety, we introduced minipool NAT 
screening in our blood donor service in 1997 for hepatitis 
B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and HIV-1 and 
in 2000 for hepatitis A virus (HAV) and parvovirus B19 
(4). For these purposes, 100-μL aliquots of up to 96 blood 
samples were pooled. The complete pool of up to 9.6 mL 
was centrifuged at 58,000× g for 60 min at 4°C. Viruses 
were extracted by using spin columns, and nucleic acid was 
eluted in a total volume of 75 μL. Only 60 μL of extract is 
needed for routine NAT screening. A residual volume of 
15 μL can then be used for additional NAT testing (5) for 
inﬂ  uenza viruses.
The real-time quantitative ampliﬁ  cation of inﬂ  uenza/
H5 was performed according to the manufacturer’s in-
structions (Artus Inﬂ  uenza/H5 LC RT-PCR Kit, QIAGEN, 
Hamburg, Germany) by using a thermocycler (LightCycler; 
Roche Applied Science, Mannheim, Germany). The test 
consists of 2 individual ampliﬁ  cation reactions. In the ﬁ  rst 
step, a generic inﬂ  uenza PCR is performed. The speciﬁ  city 
of this reaction was demonstrated for all subtypes of inﬂ  u-
enza A (H1–H15, N1–N9) and all subtypes of inﬂ  uenza B. 
Samples with a positive test result in the ﬁ  rst PCR were 
analyzed in a second PCR with inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–speciﬁ  c 
primers and probes. Therefore, the assay allows differentia-
tion between avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) and other inﬂ  uenza 
virus strains.
To mimic a situation like an H5-positive donation, a 
puriﬁ  ed culture supernatant of Vero cells infected with in-
ﬂ  uenza (H5N1) (strain A/Thailand/1 (KAN-1)/2004) (6) 
was used as an external quantiﬁ  cation standard. Virion in-
tegrity in this preparation was conﬁ  rmed by electron mi-
croscopy. The viral RNA concentration was determined in 
an external laboratory by multiple quantitative real-time 
PCR determinations (7). Different dilutions of the external 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) subtype quantiﬁ  cation standard (0.0, 0.91, 
1.96, 3.91, 7.81, 15.63, 31.25, 62.5, 125, and 250 PFU/mL) 
were prepared, and 100 μL of each dilution was spiked into 
9.5-mL negative plasma pools. Each dilution was repeat-
edly spiked and tested in 8 minipools. Five microliters of 
the extract was analyzed with the generic inﬂ  uenza NAT 
as well as with the speciﬁ  c inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) NAT. Results 
are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Probit analysis of these data 
yielded a detection probability of >95% in parallel tests 
when an average of at least 13.4 PFU/mL (95% conﬁ  dence 
interval [CI] 8.3–184 PFU/mL) and 7.4 PFU/mL (95% CI 
5.2–14.7 PFU/mL) for inﬂ  uenza generic assay and for the 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–speciﬁ  c test, respectively, were present 
in individual plasma samples before pooling.
A total of 117 routine minipools, representing 10,272 
blood donor samples, containing an average of 88 ± 8 sam-
ples per pool, had previously been tested for HIV-1, HBV, 
HCV, HAV, and parvovirus B19. All pools were negative 
for inﬂ  uenza virus when tested with the generic inﬂ  uenza 
PCR and the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–speciﬁ  c PCR. One pool 
had invalid results (failed ampliﬁ  cation of internal control 
RNA, representing 0.01% of all analyzed runs).
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Conclusions
As reported by AuBuchon et al. (8), NAT signiﬁ  cantly 
increased the safety of blood products. At the German Red 
Cross, look-back examinations showed only 1 transfusion 
had transmitted HIV-1 (1998) after the introduction of NAT 
testing. Blood donor screening by NAT was made techni-
cally and ﬁ  nancially feasible by creating minipools of up 
to 96 individual samples per pool. Roth et al. demonstrat-
ed an efﬁ  cient enrichment for all tested viruses in plasma 
samples (9). In the absence of an infective donor, different 
concentrations of the new inﬂ  uenza genotype H5N1 were 
spiked into minipools of 95 samples. As shown in Table 2, 
the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) subtype was detected by the generic 
inﬂ  uenza primers as well as by the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–spe-
ciﬁ  c primers when our routine minipool screening proce-
dure was used. Sensitivity was expressed as PFU/mL and 
can be converted into viral genome copy number according 
the calculation of Yoshikawa et al. (7). Therefore, the ana-
lytical sensitivity was ≈804 geq/mL and 444 geq/mL for 
a generic inﬂ  uenza and for the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) subtype, 
respectively. 
After screening 10,272 samples by minipool NAT, 
none of the samples were found to be infected by inﬂ  uenza, 
which corresponds with the low EISS Index (European 
Inﬂ  uenza Surveillance Scheme index) of <20 during the 
study period (February–April, 2006) (10). An EISS index 
>80 is expected during an inﬂ  uenza epidemic, as was seen 
in 2005. Therefore, blood screening should be repeated 
during the next acute inﬂ  uenza season.
Accepted incubation periods for inﬂ  uenza range from 
2 to 10 days (11,12). As with other viruses, a viremic phase 
of infection can be assumed to precede clinical symptoms 
such as fever (13,14). Recently Chutinimitkul et al. (15) 
detected inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) virus (3,080 copies/mL) in 
the plasma of a 5-year-old boy, which indicates a viremic 
phase of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infection. Those donors may be 
infective, especially to immunosuppressed patients. In ad-
dition to quarantine of infected patients, treatment with an-
tiviral drugs, and development of avian inﬂ  uenza vaccines, 
blood donors should be tested during a pandemic to avoid 
transfusion-transmitted infections. Our study demonstrates 
that NAT screening could be incorporated into blood test-
ing without delay and that the inﬂ  uenza virus could be 
sufﬁ  ciently enriched by centrifugation. Sensitivity of our 
inﬂ  uenza-screening method would have been sufﬁ  cient to 
detect recently reported virus concentrations in plasma of 
infected persons (15). However, as with all minipool meth-
ods, infections can be transmitted to transfusion recipients 
on rare occasions because the viremia level in the donor is 
below the analytical sensitivity of the screening assay.
To reduce this risk, a selective infectious dose NAT 
strategy (e.g., triggering of infectious dose NAT testing 
when at least 1 viremic donation is collected per week with 
the standard minipool screening algorithm), as performed 
for West Nile virus (WNV) screening in the United States 
might be necessary. Implementation of WNV-NAT in the 
United States in 2003 interdicted well over 1,000 donations 
from persons infected with WNV and is a good example of 
successful implementation of NAT screening for emerging 
viruses.
The collective ﬁ  ght against new viruses such as se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome virus, WNV, or inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) presents an immense challenge for the whole com-
munity, but new molecular-biologic methods offer oppor-
tunities to overcome this challenge. NAT screening tests 
are now available soon after the sequencing of new viruses. 
In the absence of a general pathogen inactivation method 
for all blood products (erythrocytes, platelets, and plasma), 
the NAT screening procedure allows testing for new vi-
ruses to ensure blood safety.
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Table 1. Analytical sensitivity for influenza virus in plasma 
samples*
PFU (H5N1) spiked  
in minipools 
No. positive/ 









*Influenza (H5N1) standard was extracted from 9.6 mL of 96 pooled donor 
samples after centrifugation. Five microliters of 75-μL nucleic acid extract 
was analyzed. The 95% detection limit was 13.4 PFU/mL; the 50% 
detection limit was 4.8 PFU/mL. 
Table 2. Analytical sensitivity for avian influenza (H5N1) virus 
subtype for plasma samples*  
PFU (H5N1) spiked  
in minipools 
No. positive/ 










*Influenza (H5N1) standard was extracted from 9.6 mL of 96 pooled donor 
samples after centrifugation. Five microliters of 75-μL nucleic acid extract 
was analyzed. The 95% detection limit was 7.4 PFU/mL; the 50% 
detection limit was 2.5 PFU/mL. Blood Screening for Inﬂ  uenza
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